ivan Posted October 20, 2019 Author Report Share Posted October 20, 2019 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ivan Posted October 21, 2019 Author Report Share Posted October 21, 2019 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ivan Posted October 21, 2019 Author Report Share Posted October 21, 2019 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted October 21, 2019 Report Share Posted October 21, 2019 999 пъти хакваха биткойна, сега почнват да хакват лайтнинга.... Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ivan Posted October 21, 2019 Author Report Share Posted October 21, 2019 Преди 1 час, vamp111 написа: 999 пъти хакваха биткойна, сега почнват да хакват лайтнинга.... По скоро описват възможността за DDOS атаките. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ivan Posted October 21, 2019 Author Report Share Posted October 21, 2019 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted October 21, 2019 Report Share Posted October 21, 2019 Преди 1 час, ivan написа: По скоро описват възможността за DDOS атаките. ако използваш чужд компютър, т.е. клауд със сигурност може да те ddos-нат, това е проблема на къстодиал портфейлите но в основата на биткойн и LN е да си подкараш собствен нод, сам да си валидираш транзакциите, сам да излъчваш LN такива, сам да си менажираш каналите сещаш се... Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ivan Posted October 21, 2019 Author Report Share Posted October 21, 2019 vamp111 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ivan Posted October 22, 2019 Author Report Share Posted October 22, 2019 vamp111 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted October 23, 2019 Report Share Posted October 23, 2019 https://decrypt.co/10655/lightning-rod-offline-payments-bitcoin-lightning-network New Lightning Rod protocol enables Bitcoin payments to be sent between two Lightning Network nodes that are not online. ivan 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ivan Posted November 2, 2019 Author Report Share Posted November 2, 2019 Lightning Network Daemon - special WHATSAT edition This repo is a fork of lnd that demonstrates how the Lightning Network can be used as an end-to-end encrypted, onion-routed, censorship-resistant, peer-to-peer chat messages protocol. Recent changes to the protocol made it possible to attach arbitrary data to a payment. This demo leverages that by attaching a text message and a sender signature. A Lightning payment delivers the message, but no actual money is paid. Because the sender uses a random payment hash, the receiver is not able to settle the payment. The failure message that is returned to the sender serves as a delivery confirmation. This means that chatting is currently free. However, there is a future in which 'free failures' don't exist anymore. Nodes may start charging a prepaid relay fee and/or start rate limiting sources that produce too many failures. In that case, chatting over Lightning may switch to actually settling the messaging payments and dropping off a few millisats at every hop. Дали тази идея ще се развие не знам. Като идея е супер, като техническа реализация не знам, може би ще натовари излишно ln мрежата или ще се окаже, че спокойно може да носи един световен чат. Дали света има нужда от енд то енд криптира чат, който да не може да цензурира, защото е децентрализиран, няма значение, ще го има. Въпроса е да ли ще бъде изграден върху биткойн/ln. batibon and vamp111 2 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted November 5, 2019 Report Share Posted November 5, 2019 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ivan Posted November 6, 2019 Author Report Share Posted November 6, 2019 https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-November/002288.html [Lightning-dev] Potential Minor Sphinx Privacy Leak and Patch Hi y'all, A new paper analyzing the security of the Sphinx mix-net packet format [1] (and also HORNET) has recently caught my attention. The paper is rather long and very theory heavy, but the TL;DR is this: * The OG Sphinx paper proved various aspects of its security using a model for onion routing originally put forth by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [2]. * This new paper discovered that certain security notions put forth in [2] weren't actually practically achievable by real-world onion routing implementations (in this case Onion-Correctnes), or weren't entirely correct or additive. New stronger security notions are put forth in response, along with extensions to the original Sphinx mix-net packet format that achieve these notions. * A flaw they discovered in the original Sphinx paper [3], can allow an exit node to deduce a lower bound of the length of the path used to reach it. The issue is that the original paper constructs the _starting packet_ (what the exit hop will receive) by adding extra padding zeroes after the destination and identifier (we've more or less revamped this with our new onion format, but it still stands). An adversarial exit node can then locate the first set bit after the identifier (our payload in this case), then use that to compute the lower bound. * One of the (?) reference Sphinx implementations recognizes that this was/is an issue in the paper and implements the mitigation [4]. * The fix on our end is easy: we need to replace those zero bytes with random bytes when constructing the starting packet. I've created a PR to lnd's lightning-onion PR implementing this mitigation [5]. As this changes the starting packet format, we also need to either update the test vectors or we can keep them as is, and note that we use zeroes so the test vectors are fully deterministic. My PR to the spec patching the privacy leak leaves the test vectors untouched as is [6]. With all that said, IMO we have larger existing privacy leaks just due to our unique application of the packet format. As an example, a receiver can use the CLTV of the final HTLC to deduce bounds on the path length as we have a restricted topology and CLTV values for public channels are all known. Another leak is our usage of the variable length onion payloads which a node can use to ascertain path length since they space they consume counts towards the max hop count of 20-something. In any case, we can patch this with just a few lines of code (fill out with random bytes) at _senders_, and don't need any intermediate nodes to update. The new and old packet construction algos are compatible as packet _processing_ isn't changing, instead just the starting set of bytes are. As always, please double-check by interpretation of the paper, as it's possible I'm missing something. If my interpretation stands, then it's a relatively minor privacy leak, and an easy low-hanging fruit that can be patched without wide-spread network coordination. -- Laolu Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ivan Posted November 6, 2019 Author Report Share Posted November 6, 2019 rippleche and vamp111 2 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted November 12, 2019 Report Share Posted November 12, 2019 https://kumo.chat/ goodbye mIRC via Lightning Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
rippleche Posted November 12, 2019 Report Share Posted November 12, 2019 И за вс пари искат вече Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted November 12, 2019 Report Share Posted November 12, 2019 е да ама ако например продаваш дрога или информации, няма ли да си платиш $1 за да се разберем безопасно в нета, вместо да ползваме mIRC примерно ? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ivan Posted November 13, 2019 Author Report Share Posted November 13, 2019 Интересни неща пише. LN има още доста да се развива, извървя не малко път, но taproot ще добави още доста възможности...за доразвитието му. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted November 13, 2019 Report Share Posted November 13, 2019 този подкаст още не е станал много известен, изслушай епизода, най-добрия до тук Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted November 18, 2019 Report Share Posted November 18, 2019 доста интересен епизод, който съм пропуснал Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted November 20, 2019 Report Share Posted November 20, 2019 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted December 3, 2019 Report Share Posted December 3, 2019 Finex водят в класацията както винаги rippleche 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted December 3, 2019 Report Share Posted December 3, 2019 ето и официалното обявление https://www.bitfinex.com/posts/440 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted December 5, 2019 Report Share Posted December 5, 2019 пропуснах това това е част от стратегията на Финекс да си възвърнат Китайските клиенти, не се залъгвайте, чрез gift картите ежедневно се перат милиони долари, битрефил осигурява ликвидност, финекс субсидира, това е начин по който Китайците байпасват капитал контрол-а наложен в/у тях от правителството им, проблем който се разрешава и чрез iTunes акаунти ... Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
vamp111 Posted December 5, 2019 Report Share Posted December 5, 2019 два типа хора, едните по цял ден се взират в цената, другите строят и се подготвят за революцията AdamKadmon 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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